The conservation of fish stocks in the world's exclusive economic zones (EEZs) 
Introduction
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a frequently reliedupon expression in fisheries policy and management circles to refer to operations involving the harvesting of marine fish stocks carried out in ways that either contravene or circumvent domestic or international fisheries conservation and management laws and/or the conservation and management rules of certain international organisations. Due to its vast environmental and human costs, IUU fishing has gained visibility in recent years, making headlines and being featured in international security agendas (see Bueger 2015) . Much attention has rightly been paid to the complex issues raised by IUU fishing in the high seas and associated issues of flag State responsibility, yet IUU fishing activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the responsibilities of coastal States to address it merit just as much attention. This article introduces the term IUU fishing and highlights its relevance to the activities of fleets operating in the EEZ for non-transboundary stock.
It also explores the responsibility of the coastal State in respect of these operations by reference to a recent advisory opinion by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Highlighting that the coastal State bears the primary, though not exclusive, responsibility for the IUU fishing operations of vessels inside the EEZ, the article argues that opportunities to make the coastal State accountable for shortcomings in its conservation and management obligations, which include those in respect of IUU control, are insufficient at the international level. Yet, although deficient and underdeveloped, accountability mechanisms are not completely absent, particularly when non-judicial and domestic options are taken into consideration.
IUU Fishing: A Complex Issue Empirically and Legally
The first global document to specify the scope of IUU fishing was the jurisdiction appropriately and has left regulatory voids that leave stocks unprotected. Paragraph 3.4 of the IPOA seems to suggest that paragraph 3.3 is intended to capture activities that evidence underlying inconsistencies with international law (Theilen 2013) . The implication of this, with regard to subparagraph 3.3.1, is that the activities referred to therein must be inconsistent with the regulatory State's obligations under international law, even if this is not specifically stated in the paragraph.
Hence, the intention of paragraph 3.4 is to bring paragraph 3.3 in its entirety in line with the two previous paragraphs, and all of the activities to which they refer, as the bases for the adoption of the market and other measures set out in subsequent parts of the IPOA.
The description of IUU fishing contained in the IPOA is of relevance to the coastal State in respect of each of the three perspectives, insofar as all three potentially refer to fishery activities that may contravene or undermine legal conservation and management rules in the EEZ, or that are otherwise exploitative of deficits in domestic fishery regulation.
Drivers and Global Impacts of IUU Fishing
The drivers of IUU fishing are predominantly financial: gains are derived from the ability to trade with undiscerning markets and enhanced by evading regulatory costs. (Flothmann et al. 2010 ) Given the regulated nature of fisheries activities, the perpetuation of IUU fishing is facilitated by deficiencies in regulatory frameworks and by a lack of rigorous execution by the public authorities with responsibility for fishery governance. 4 An important part of the impacts derived from overfishing are believed to be attributable to IUU Fishing (FAO 2014) . Broadly, these encompass fish-stock depletion (Agnew et al. 2009) populations (Pitcher et al. 2002). 5 Despite the difficulties associated with the detection and recording of infractions, IUU fishing is widely thought to inflict vast costs to the global economy, with a frequently cited study suggesting between US$ 10 and 23.5 Billion per annum (Agnew et al. 2009 ). According to a 2015 publication by the European Union (EU), costs might be in the region of Euro 10 Billion per year, which corresponds to 19% of the worldwide reported value of catches (EU Directorate of Maritime Affairs). Least-developed countries are among the most vulnerable, due to the fact that reliance on fish for nutrition tends to be greater than in developed countries, (FAO 2014: p 7; Allison, E. H. et al. 2009 ) and reliance on production and exportation of fish products is also greater (54% of all fish exports by value, and over 60% by quantity) (FAO 2014: p 8) , while ability to plan and execute adaptation to biomass reduction is diminished by a lack of capacity (Allison et al. 2009 ).
IUU fishing undermines the long-term profitability of the fishing industry, being not only a resource drain but also a source of unfair competition to lawabiding fishers: as IUU fishing operators are unencumbered by regulatory and legal constraints, they benefit from quota diverted from legal fishers and income withheld from fisheries authorities (Stokke 2009 ). In turn, the presence of IUU fishing can intensify pressure on authorities to increase quotas, as well as undermine fishers' appetite for compliance (ibid.).
Further, as those who engage in IUU operations must act covertly, they contribute to the emergence and perpetuation of corruption in seafood production and distribution chains (Standing 2008; Sundstrom 2012 Inevitably, fragile States with resource-rich waters, endemic poverty and high perceived levels of systemic corruption are particularly vulnerable to the irregular fishery access practices frequently linked to IUU fishing (Agnew et al. 2009; Standing 2008) .
It is important to note that deficiencies in connection with data reporting are not unique to fisheries dependent on developing countries for their regulation. adequate fishery controls in Thailand to the emergence of wrongs of a criminal nature, with the reliance on migrant smuggling to secure cheap work on board fishing vessels flagged as a particularly prevalent problem.
According to these accounts, foreign persons that were often unskilled and unable to communicate effectively had been indentured to work on Thailand's fishing vessels and regularly subjected to inhumane working conditions, torture and even murder at the hands of captains and the senior crew. Hence, in addition to being detrimental to stocks and their environment, to the rule of law and to the effectiveness of fisheries governance, IUU fishing inflicts detrimental impacts on diverse human populations and undermines the fabric of fisheries economies. These effects justify the inclusion of IUU fishing in maritime security strategies. 10 IUU fishing can be understood as a threat to human security (Bueger 2015) , irrespective of whether it occurs domestically or beyond areas of national jurisdiction.
The Importance of Coastal State Governance
Much attention has been paid in international legal literature to the governance of high seas (Molenaar 2007; Serdy 2011; Barnes 2012; Elferink 2012; Takei 2013) and to deficient control of fishing vessels by flag States (Bratspies 2001; Warner Kramer 2004; Rayfuse 2005; Erceg 2006; Miller 2014 (Barnes 2006: 233) , but, as already stated, they also form part of coastal economies and make an important contribution to the international economy through exports, fishery support activities and the granting of access to foreign fleets.
Coastal State Governance of EEZ Resources and International Law
The protection of the resources of the EEZ and their interlinked environments Adopted measures must ensure that stocks can produce their maximum sustainable yield, but conservation is conditioned by certain qualifications (Barnes 2006 There are no binding international legal parameters of which fishery conducts must be addressed in respect of non-transboundary EEZ stock.
A list of activities is found in FSA Article 21.11, which, before the term IUU fishing had officially been coined, had typified specific activities that it 
Brief Introduction to Accountability
Accountability in a general sense refers to the vast array of public and non-public mechanisms whereby a community in pursuit of desired policy objectives balances order and freedom (Dubnick & Yang 2009) In the context of relationships between and amongst international actors, where certain expectations of performance exist in respect of shared or common interests, accountability has often been equated with data-sharing processes that seek to improve management and foster transparency (Krisch & Benedict 2006) . While there can be little doubt that transparency is essential for accountability, some authors also argue that one of the key implications of accountability is that potential ex-post-facto consequences should follow transgressions or shortfalls in performance against assumed obligations and related conduct standards (Grant & Keohane 2005) . Whether the need for consequences is accepted as a necessary aspect of accountability or not, ascertaining the existence and nature of the rules under which conduct expectations are formed is an essential first step in ascertaining whether and how accountability may be facilitated.
Accountability Mechanisms Incorporating Legal Rules of Conduct
In order to understand whether traditional international law can facilitate accountability in respect of coastal State deficiencies in IUU fishing control, it is first necessary to explore whether specific norms may function as an appropriate rule of conduct against which assessments can be made. these organisations (ibid: Art. 31.3 and 31.6 (b) ). Further, in the context of this mechanism, legal norms have been interpreted by reference to the more-specific rules of the IPOA.
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Despite these strengths, however, regimes of this nature have limitations.
First, in contrast to access agreements, these mechanisms have little reach in cases where the domestic stock has been harvested in the EEZ by foreign vessels, as the trade-related measures upon which it relies as ultimate sanctions are imposed on the exporting nation, which is not the coastal State but the fishing vessel's flag State (ibid: p 10). 20 Second, while one of its advantages is that it can rely on standards contained in the quasi-legal rules of the RFMOs, these are not directly relevant to the protection of non-transboundary domestic stock: where they address IUU fishing activities, these rules involve capture activities vis-à-vis the stock they manage in their regulatory areas, which will normally occur at least partially in the high seas. Last, market accountability, even if underpinned by a substantial legal and regulatory framework, is no substitute for judicial processes, as it is not only able to directly contribute to legal interpretation but is also less sensitive to the relative power of the parties to the dispute (Charnovitz 2001) . By contrast, market-related mechanisms are unlikely to be either resisted or deployed by the less economically developed States or by those with dependent markets (Grant & Keohane 2005 protection of domestic non-transboundary stock. Market-and port-entry denial, vessel black lists and product documentation have and continue to be deployed as measures to combat IUU fishing. The same criticism levelled at the IUU Regulation can be applied to these mechanisms in respect of market asymmetries (Stokke 2009 ). In particular, RFMOs can only address IUU fishing activities involving the stock they manage in their regulatory areas, which by definition will be straddling, highly migratory or discrete to the high seas, and will exclude non-transboundary domestic stock.
While accountability in the mechanisms specified in the above paragraphs 
